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Abstract
I construct a model of public policy development, and use the model to explain why
the United States has a comparatively small public sector, but instead a large ￿private
welfare state￿with employment-based bene￿ts. The key actors are politically organized
￿rms and labor unions. These interest groups can use campaign support to in￿ uence a
political decision-maker who decides whether to implement a social bene￿t. In addition,
the ￿rms can in￿ uence the outcome indirectly by privately providing their own workers
with the bene￿t. This setup leads to three possible outcomes. In the ￿rst, no one is
provided the social bene￿t. In the second, all workers receive it through government
provision. In the third, some workers receive the policy, through their employers. I
argue that the features leading to the third equilibrium correspond closely to political
institutions and industry characteristics of the US, while the features of the second
equilibrium better describe European countries.
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discussions and suggestions.
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11 Introduction
Why does the United States, in comparison with other industrialized nations, have a small
public sector but a large ￿private welfare state￿in the form of private and ￿rm-based social
bene￿ts? This is the question I address in the ￿rst chapter. In my e⁄ort to provide an
answer, I construct a formal model of policy change and use this model to develop a theory
that is based on di⁄erences in industry and interest group structures as well as political
institutions.
These public-private welfare state di⁄erences are, of course, part of the broader question
of why the European and US welfare states are so di⁄erent, and closely related to the
literature on di⁄erences between countries in redistributive e⁄orts. Most of the formalized
attempts to answer these questions have used di⁄erent versions of, and extensions to, the
median voter theorem. Perhaps the best-known study along these lines is Meltzer and
Richard (1981), where the level of redistribution is derived to be a function of the level
of (pre-tax) inequality. Subsequent work, for instance by Benabou and Ok (2001), has
extended this model to take into account uncertainty and mobility, and has challenged the
straight-forward link between inequality and redistribution. In addition, recent work using
more sophisticated frameworks than the median voter model has investigated the e⁄ects of
ethnic/racial heterogeneity, beliefs about social mobility, religion and the role of political
constitutions.1
While this body of literature has signi￿cantly enhanced our understanding of the dif-
ferences in redistributive e⁄orts between countries, at least two major issues have thus far
been neglected by economists and positive political theorists. The ￿rst is the role of interest
1Austen-Smith and Wallerstein (2003) and Lee and Roemer (2006) are two theoretical models of the
e⁄ects of ethnic and racial diversity on redistributive public spending. Alston and Ferrie (1993, 1999)
present a related argument, with a speci￿c focus on the role of the South in U.S. legislative politics. Scheve
and Stasavage (2006a, 2006b) analyze the relationship between religion and preferences for social insurance.
Piketty (1994) shows that experienced social mobility can a⁄ect preferences for public spending and the
level of redistribution in a society. Persson and Tabellini (2003) is a detailed investigation of the role of
constitutions. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) provide an overview of these and other theories, in an attempt to
explain the di⁄erences between the US and Europe.
2groups in welfare state development. The second is the fact that there are di⁄erences in
the shape and mode of delivery, and not just the size, of welfare states. Both of these top-
ics are closely linked to the question I attempt to answer here, and therefore merit further
discussion.
While models of special interest politics have been applied extensively to particular eco-
nomic issues, notably trade policy and industrial regulation, economists have largely ne-
glected the role of interest groups in the development of welfare states.2 This neglect is
striking considering the fact that the comparative welfare state literature - a literature that
spans the ￿elds of political science, history and sociology - assigns central roles to organized
employers and workers. For instance, the in￿ uential analytical approach typically referred
to as ￿power resource theory￿is based on the idea that the extensiveness and shape of a
welfare state is a function of the strength of labor unions relative to organized employers.3
In addition, scholars within the leading alternative framework referred to as ￿historical in-
stitutionalism,￿appear to be moving towards incorporating organized labor and employers
in analyses of social policies and labor market regimes.4
In addition to neglecting the role of interest groups, (political) economists typically fail
to recognize that the di⁄erences between the welfare states that developed during the 20th
century, in particular between the US and Europe, are not limited merely to the level of re-
distribution. There are also signi￿cant di⁄erences in the structure of the welfare states. Most
European countries, in a somewhat simpli￿ed characterization, have larger public sectors and
2The theoretical literature on interest groups is too large to summarize here. Early in￿ uential papers on
the role of special interest groups in shaping regulation include Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976). Becker
(1985) is an in￿ uential paper following in the Chicago tradition of Stigler and Peltzman, though with a more
general focus. The seminal paper on interest groups and trade policy is Grossman and Helpman (1994).
The recent theoretical interest group literature is summarized by Grossman and Helpman (2001, 2002). A
non-technical overview of the early literature is provided by Mitchell and Munger (1991). Two studies that
do employ economic reasoning in the context of interest groups and welfare state development are Mares
(2003) and Lindert (2004). These studies, however, focus on a set of questions quite di⁄erent from this
paper.
3The power resource theory is most closely associated with the work of Korpi (1978, 1983). In addition, the
in￿ uential work of Esping-Andersen (1990) draws heavily on this theoretical framework. Critical evaluations
of the power resource theory are given by O￿ Connor and Olsen (1993) as well by Hicks and Misra (1993).
4This point is made by Swenson (2004). See, for instance, Thelen (2004) for a work in the tradition of
historical institutionalism that incorporates both employers and labor unions in the analysis.
3an extensive range of publicly provided universal policies. The US, on the other hand, has a
smaller public sector and fewer universal policies. However, it also has an extensive system of
bene￿ts provided by employers, sometimes referred to as a ￿private welfare state.￿ 5 Perhaps
the best-known example of these di⁄erences is health insurance, which is generally provided
universally through the public sector in Europe while largely tied to jobs/employers in the
US. In addition, there are a number of social policies, such as sickness pay, child care and
paid paternal leave, that, when available, are typically provided through the public sector in
Europe, but in the US tend to be private and ￿rm-based bene￿ts available to some segments
of the workforce.
This neglect of the private welfare state is not limited to economists. Most of the research
on the development of welfare states in related ￿elds, such as political science, history and
sociology, has also focused almost exclusively on the public sector, i.e. on the activities of the
state.6 Recently, however, there has been a surge of interest in the development of the private
welfare state in the US.7 Much of this work has combined the interest in the private welfare
state with interest group politics. Among the things that have emerged from this small
but growing literature is a clear connection between these two topics. That is, the public
and private welfare state structures are, to a signi￿cant extent, the result of interactions
between economic interest groups, such as labor unions and business organizations. These
studies, however, have focused primarily on describing and understanding the details of the
American experience, leaving open the question of why the US came to di⁄er from other
5The term ￿private welfare state￿does not refer to a well-de￿ned concept. Absent better alternative I
will use it here simply to refer to a system of ￿rm-based social bene￿ts.
6This is, to a large extent, true even for research that has been focused precisely on understanding
the di⁄erences between welfare states, such as the already mentioned in￿ uential work by Esping-Andersen
(1990), as well as the research of Korpi and Palme (1996) and Rothstein (2001) on universal/encompassing
vs selective/minimal welfare state. Gottschalk (2000) argues convincingly that this lack of political science
research on privately provided social bene￿ts is the outcome of an arti￿cial and problematic distinction
between the ￿elds of industrial relations and political science.
7Among these recent studies are Gottschalk (2000), Klein (2002) and Hacker (2001). Related is also the
comparative work on the US and Sweden by Swenson (2002). Note that there is also an older literature on
welfare capitalism in the US in the beginning of the 20th Century, before the Great Depression and the New
Deal. Brandes (1976) and Tone (1997) are two examples. However, as will be clear in later sections, this
literature is not of primary interest to the analysis in this paper, as the focus here is on a later period.
4advanced welfare states.8
In this essay, I develop a model of political decision-making with respect to a given social
policy interpreted as a ￿welfare state bene￿t.￿The model allows for private (￿rm-based)
provision as well as public (government) provision of this bene￿t. In the model, economic
interest groups - business organizations representing ￿rms and labor unions representing
workers - can use campaign contributions to in￿ uence a political decision-maker who has to
decide whether to implement a universal social bene￿t, e.g. government-provided universal
health care. In addition, the ￿rms can in￿ uence the outcome indirectly by privately providing
their own workers with the same social bene￿t, thereby reducing the interest of the workers
and the unions in having it provided universally. Workers receive a positive utility from the
policy and would like to see it implemented by the government, unless their employers have
provided them with the same bene￿t directly. The ￿rms, who pay a signi￿cant share of the
tax burden if the bene￿t is provided by the government but place no intrinsic value on its
adoption, would prefer not to see it implemented. The model has two industrial sectors, and
asymmetries across the two sectors (e.g. in pro￿ts) imply that the ￿rms in one sector dislike
governmental provision to a greater extent than the ￿rms in the other sector.
This setup leads to three possible outcomes. In the ￿rst, no one is provided the social
bene￿t. In the second, all workers receive it through the public sector. In the third, some
but not necessarily all of the workers receive the bene￿t privately, through their employ-
ers. I argue that the underlying characteristics of the third equilibrium correspond more
closely to the industrial features and political institutions of the US, while the second equi-
librium is a better description of European countries. More speci￿cally, the model shows
8Hacker (2001) does provide a theory of why the US came to di⁄er from other countries. His theory is
based primarily on the idea of ￿path dependence,￿that small and possibly random initial di⁄erences can lead
countries into di⁄erent policy paths. This essay di⁄ers in that I try to use a formal model to identify initial
(underlying) economic conditions that would lead countries into di⁄erent paths. Hence I view the theory
developed here as a complementary rather than competing framework to that of Hacker. Another commonly
held view is that wage ceilings in the US during World War II lead ￿rms to introduce non-wage bene￿ts. I
do not dispute that this can explain some part of the development of ￿rm-based bene￿ts. However, as shown
by Hacker, most of the increase in non-wage bene￿ts happened after the war, hence cannot be explained by
these wage controls.
5that an outcome with (some) private but not public provision is more likely in a country with
greater asymmetries across the two sectors. For instance, private provision is more likely in
a country where the ￿rms in the modern industrial sector of the economy are particularly
pro￿table, and where the unions in the traditional, non-industrialized sector of the economy
are particularly weak. Furthermore, in an extension to the baseline model, I show that there
are interaction e⁄ects between the interest group structures and political institutions of a
country; a fragmented political system with multiple veto points is shown to inhibit out-
comes with public provision, and possibly also favor outcomes with private provision. Since
these are all characteristics of the US economic and political system, in the decades following
World War II during which the welfare states grew into their current structures, I claim that
the model provides a possible explanation for the unique way in which the American welfare
state developed.
I now proceed, in Section 2, by describing the theoretical model. An informal overview
is followed by a formal characterization of the setup. Section 3 is the heart of the theoretical
analysis. I ￿rst derive some straight-forward auxiliary results that characterize the structure
of equilibrium contributions, then characterize the di⁄erent types of equilibria of the full
model. In a series of propositions, I show how the outcome depends on the industry char-
acteristics and the e⁄ect that privately provided bene￿ts have on public opinion. In Section
4, I extend the model by introducing a second political decision-maker with veto power and
show that this can have an e⁄ect on the outcome. In Section 5, I discuss how the actual char-
acteristics of the US and other industrialized nations compare to the di⁄erent equilibria of
the theoretical model. This discussion draws upon multiple strands of existing work, includ-
ing the already mentioned work on the private American welfare state, the work of business
historians on industry structures, comparative research by labor economists on unionization
rates, and comparative work on institutional fragmentation by political scientists. Finally,
Section 6 contains a conclusion and a discussion of potentially fruitful extensions.
62 The Model
2.1 Setup
The formal model has ￿ve players: a political decision-maker, two unions and two business
organizations. The political decision-maker, which may be interpreted as an individual
politician or a party, has one choice to make: whether to implement a given social policy. The
decision-maker cares about two things, the general public opinion (the ￿public support￿for
the policy) and the support in the form of contributions from the four interest groups. Each
union represents the unionized workers in one of two industrial sectors. It has one decision
to make: how much to contribute to the politician. Each business group represents all the
￿rms in one of the two industrial sectors. Like the unions, the business organizations have
to decide how much to contribute to the politician. In addition, the business organizations
have the option of having its members (the ￿rms) provide its workers with the social policy
as the politician may implement.
The ￿rms are homogeneous within each sector: all ￿rms employ the same number of
workers and make the same pre-tax pro￿ts (￿). However, the number of workers and pro￿ts
per ￿rm may di⁄er between the two sectors. All workers earn the same pre-tax wage (w). The
unions do not necessarily represent all of the workers, and the union membership rates (m)
are potentially di⁄erent between the two sectors. As the focus is on the political game, this
economic structure is exogenous to the model and the pro￿ts, wages and union membership
rates in both sectors are parameters of the model.9
If the political decision-maker decides to implement the policy, all workers receive a
bene￿t of given value (v). The policy is then ￿nanced by a linear tax (t) on pro￿ts and
labor income. (As will be clear, the tax burden of primary interest is the one leveled on the
9The idea behind the two-sector structure is that the ￿rst sector represents capital-intensive industries
with large ￿rms, while the second sector represents more traditional, labor-intensive industries with smaller
￿rms. This is relevant primarily in the context of the application, as there is nothing inherent in the theory
that forces this interpretation. Still, it is useful to keep in mind that the model is developed to analyze not
the economic structure of today but an earlier part of the 20th century, and that the ￿rst sector represents
what used to be the ￿modern￿part of the economy.
7￿rms.) If a business organization decides that its ￿rms should provide the policy privately
to the workers within its sectors, the workers in the sector derive the same value (v) as if
the policy was provided by the government. A worker who has received the policy privately
receives no additional utility from public provision. Private provision is costly to the ￿rms
and gives them no direct bene￿t; hence the only reason the ￿rms in a sector would want to
provide privately is that it may change the decision of the politician.
The timing of the baseline model is the following. First, the two business organiza-
tions decide whether their ￿rms should o⁄er the policy privately to their workers. Then all
the interest groups communicate how much they (i.e. their members) would be willing to
contribute to the politician, as a function of the political decision. Finally, the politician
decides whether to implement the policy, and the interest groups deliver their contributions
as communicated in the previous stage.10
To formally de￿ne the game, subscripts i;j 2 f1;2g is used to denote the sector while
superscripts u, b indicate unions and business respectively. The set of fundamental para-
meters is f￿1;￿2;w;k;k2;k2;v;L1;L2;N1;N2;m1;m2g. In addition to parameters already
introduced, k is the per-worker cost of providing the policy in the public sector and ki is the
cost of provision in sector i. L and N denote the number workers and ￿rms respectively.
The vector y 2 Y ￿ f1;0g
2 indicates which of the two business organizations that have
decided to provide the bene￿t privately. For instance, y = (1;0) indicates that the employers
in the ￿rst but not in the second sector provide the policy privately to their workers. The
function R : Y ! R gives the increase in public support that follows from implementation
of the policy. This function maps private provision decisions into a level of public support,
which means that the public support for government provision is allowed to depend on the
private provision decisions of the ￿rms.11
10Here, as in virtually all existing models of interest group politics, the capacity of interest groups to commit
to future contributions is simply assumed. Ideally, however, the relationship between interest groups and
policy-makers should be modeled as a repeated game, without exogenously imposed commitment capacities.
11When intepreting the results I will assume throughout the paper that R(0;0) > R(0;1); R(1;0) and
R(0;1); R(1;0) > R(1;1), which means that public support for provision decreases as more workers are
provided the bene￿t privately. I believe these are natural assumptions, and they simplify the interpretation
8Lowercase letter c denotes what an individual ￿rm/worker contributes, whereas uppercase
C denotes what an interest group contributes in total. For instance, cu
i denotes the political
contributions of one union member working in sector i, whereas Cu
i gives the sum of the
contributions of all unionized workers in that sector. The reader should keep in mind that
the contribution o⁄ers are made conditional upon the political decision (denoted p), as I will
sometimes leave this out to simplify notation. Finally, the tax rate, which will be pinned
down by assumptions, is denoted by t. Using this notation, the game can be de￿ned formally
by:
￿ Set of players: fB1;B2;U1;U2;Pg
￿ Strategy set for a business group: f1;0g ￿
￿
Cb
i : Y ! R2
+
￿
￿ Strategy set for a union:
￿
Cu
i : Y ! R2
+
￿
￿ Action set for the policy-maker: P = f1;0g




























i + v; if Bi does provide
￿
p = R(y) + [C(1) ￿ C(0)]
where ￿p represents not a utility, but the di⁄erence in utility for the policy-maker between
choosing p = 1 and p = 0. That is, ￿p > 0 means that the political decision-maker receives
a greater utility from implementing the policy than not implementing it.
The strategies and utilities need some further explanation. Starting with the business
groups (B), the ￿rst part of a strategy is the decision whether their members should provide
of the theory. However, strictly speaking, they are not necessary for the theoretical results.
9the policy privately. The second part is a function that maps the private implementation








set of all such functions. (The schedule is two-dimensional because the interest groups have to
announce what they will contribute conditional on the policy choice.) In the utility functions
of the business groups, the ￿rst term is the post-tax income of each ￿rm, the second term is
the amount that each ￿rm contributes. The third term is the amount a ￿rm has to pay in
order to provide the bene￿t to its workers.
As the unions (U) do not make private provision decisions, each union￿ s strategy has
only one component: a function that maps the business groups￿implementation decisions
into a campaign contribution schedule. The utility function of the unions is also similar to
the one for the business groups, with the exception that the unions do not anything pay in
the case of private provision. Instead there is the utility of the policy, v, received either in
the case of private provision in the sector, or in the case of public implementation (p = 1).
Since the political decision-maker (P) has one decision to make, its action set consists
simply of the actions ￿implement the policy￿ (p = 1) and ￿not implement the policy￿






i (1) ￿ C
g
i (0)] captures
how much more P would receive in future campaign support from the interest groups if it
chose to implement the policy. As already mentioned, R(y) is the increase in public support
that would follow from implementation of the policy, normalized such that its e⁄ect is directly
comparable to the e⁄ect of interest group contributions.
2.2 Assumptions on Taxes and Contributions
The assumptions imposed in this subsection pin down the link from strategies to payo⁄s,
hence complete the setup of the model. First of all, the link from public spending to taxation
has to be determined. I will assume throughout the chapter that the government has to
12The strategy set of the politician is more complex than the action set. However, as equilibrium strategies
of the politician will take on a very simple form (more on this in next section), only the action sets are used
to de￿ne the game.
10balance its budget. That is, the total cost of public provision, L1k + L2k, has to be met by
the total taxes paid. Furthermore I assume that the full tax burden can be approximated by
the tax on pro￿ts, and the tax on labor income can be ignored.13 Together, these assumptions
imply the following equation: (N1￿1 + N2￿2)tb = (L1 + L2)k. Dropping the superscript, we






N1￿1+N2￿2k , if p=1
0 , if p=0.
For political contributions, I assume the following: if a business organization (union)
decides to make contributions, all ￿rms (unionized workers) within that sector will contribute













With respect to the cost of providing the social bene￿t, I assume that the ￿rms are able







k; i = 1;2:
13While conceptually a signi￿cant simpli￿cation, this assumption is not as restrictive as it may seem.
Under mild restrictions none of the key comparative statics results depend on the level of labor taxation.
A su¢ cient restriction for this to be true is that all workers, in the absence of any political contributions,
would prefer an outcome with government provision over no provision. In formal terms, this means that for
any feasible value of tl(1), it would be the case that tl(1)w ￿ v; i = 1;2.
14This assumption matters for the interpretation of the e⁄ects of the cost parameters, not for that of the
other parameters. For instance, it is possible that economies-of-scale in the provision of bene￿ts would imply
a higher, possibly even prohibitively high, cost per worker for small and independent ￿rms. Alternatively, it
might be the case that ￿rms receive some direct bene￿t from private provision, e.g. from e⁄ects on wages or
productivity, that should appropriately be modeled by setting ki < k for i = 1;2. This would not change the
key theoretical results, though it would a⁄ect the results with respect to the cost parameters themselves.
112.3 Equilibrium Selection
For most of the analysis that follows, standard subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is a su¢ -
cient tool for analyzing the model. It is, however, expositionally and analytically convenient
to focus on equilibria that also satisfy the following restriction:
(ER1) Among the interest groups, the contribution schedules are not pareto dominated by
any other equilibrium contribution schedules.
This restriction means that in equilibrium the interest groups will not make contribution
o⁄ers such that they would wish for their least desired policy to be the outcome of the
political process. Note that this restriction is not vacuous: it will in fact rule out some
equilibria. In addition, for most of the chapter the focus will be on pure strategy equilibria.
The notion of equilibrium used in the rest of the chapter can now be de￿ned:
De￿nition 1 Unless otherwise stated, an equilibrium will refer to a subgame perfect equi-
librium in pure strategies that satis￿es (ER1).
Before moving on to the analysis, there is one more indeterminacy of the model that
needs to be dealt with. If two interest groups o⁄er strictly positive contributions conditional
on a particular policy choice (either p = 0 or p = 1), there is nothing in the model so far that
pins down each group￿ s equilibrium share of the total contributions. The restriction used
in deriving comparative statics results will be to focus on equilibria where, if two interest
groups o⁄er strictly positive contributions in two di⁄erent subgames, their relative shares
of the total contributions are the same in both of these subgames. Any bargaining process
that represents this restriction will deliver the results below, and I will stay agnostic on the
speci￿cs and simply let these relative shares be exogenously given.15 More speci￿cally, I will
let si denote the share of campaign contributions o⁄ered by the interest groups in sector i
15An implication of this is that the bargaining among groups pushing for the same outcome will not be a
central component of the theoretical analysis. One could imagine di⁄erent ways of modeling this bargaining,
such as the Nash or Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions. However, while possibly of theoretical interest, a more
careful analysis of this process is of limited interest for the purpose of this paper.
12against public implementation of the policy. That is, si is the share of the total contributions
following policy choice p = 0 that is o⁄ered by a group in sector i. Similarly, sj will denote
the share of campaign contributions o⁄ered in favor of public implementation (i.e. following
p = 1) by a group in sector j. This notation is imprecise, but the use of si and sj should be
clear in context. In any case, these parameters will completely characterize the outcome of
the bargaining process when there are several interest groups that o⁄er contributions towards
the same policy choice and their shares have to be determined.16
3 Baseline Model Results
Under this setup there are six possible outcomes: no provision, public provision, private
provision in sector 1 only, private provision in sector 2 only, private provision in both sectors,
and public together with private provision. We can, however, easily rule out the last case. To
see this, note simply that if one of the business groups decides that its ￿rms should provide
the bene￿t privately, and the policy is also implemented publicly, the business group can
always remove both the private provision and all contributions to the politician. The worst
possible outcome is that the policy is still implemented publicly, in which case the group
will have saved the cost of private provision. The key point here is that the policy has no
intrinsic value to the employers, hence there is no reason for the business group to provide
privately if it does not a⁄ect the political outcome.
Remark 1 There cannot be an equilibrium outcome in which there is both public and private
provision.
Furthermore, the two cases with private provision are identical to analyze. I order the
sectors such that if there is private provision in one of them it will be in sector 1, and leave
16In the analysis that follows, I will assume that if V b ￿R(y) ￿ V u then
￿
V b ￿ R(y)
￿
sj ￿ V u
j for j = 1;2,
and similarly if V b ￿ V u + R(y) then V b
i ￿ [V u + R(y)]si for i = 1;2. These assumptions guarantee
interior solutions to the equlibrium conditions. While not without loss of generality, this greatly simpli￿es
notation and exposition. Furthermore, a more careful analysis of corner solutions would deliver qualitatively
unchanged results.
13out the characterization of the equilibrium with private provision in sector 2.
3.1 Auxiliary Results
It is useful to start the analysis by characterizing equilibrium behavior in the subgames
starting in period two. Let us start with the politician. Remember that the private provision
decisions by the ￿rms are given by vector y. The following remark, which fully characterizes
what behavior of the politician that is consistent with equilibrium, is immediate from the
setup:
Remark 2 In equilibrium the politician chooses to implement the policy if C(0) < C(1) +
R(y), and vice versa. If C(0) = C(1)+R(y), any action taken by the politician is consistent
with equilibrium behavior.
Turning to the structure of the contribution schedules, we can show the following:
Lemma 1 In any SPE, Cu(0) = 0 ) C(0) = Cb(0). Similarly, Cb(1) = 0 ) C(1) = Cu(1):
Proof. See Appendix A.
In words, the lemma says that only unions could be contributing in favor of political
implementation, and only business groups could be contributing against. Though simple,
this result is useful as it means that the original ￿menu auction￿setting (with two choices
on the menu) can be analyzed in a manner similar to a ￿rst-price auction. The lemma
also implies that, when characterizing equilibrium behavior, we can drop the superscripts
indicating whether a contribution is o⁄ered by a union or a business organization.
For the business organizations, we can now de￿ne the maximum willingness to contribute,
equal to the value placed on a change in the political decision, in the following way:
V
b
i ￿ t￿iNi; i = 1;2
V
b ￿ t(￿1N1 + ￿2N2):




i ￿ vmiLi; i = 1;2
V
u ￿ v (m1L1 + m2L2):
Using these de￿nitions, we can show the following:
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium with only public provision the unions together contribute V b￿
R(0;0), and the business organizations o⁄er to contribute V b. Similarly, in an equilibrium
without any provision the business groups contribute V u + R(0;0), and the unions o⁄er to
contribute V u. In an equilibrium with private provision in sector 1 but no public provision
the business groups contribute V u
2 + R(1;0), and the unions o⁄er to contribute V u
2 .
Proof. See Appendix A.
This lemma captures two things. First, in any equilibrium it must be the case that the
political decision-maker is indi⁄erent. Secondly, the losing interest groups must be o⁄ering
to contribute exactly as much as a di⁄erent policy outcome would be worth to them.
In order to analyze the conditions leading to each type of equilibrium, this is all we need.
Before moving on to equilibrium characterizations it might, however, be of interest to pay
some attention to when an equilibrium exists, as well as when there is a unique equilibrium.
Formal results regarding existence and uniqueness are relegated to the appendix. The results,
however, are easily summarized. In brief, there always exists an SPE of the game, and
there always exists one that satis￿es (ER1). Finally, if we also impose some inter-sectoral
bargaining rule (e.g. the one described in section 2.3) for determining the relative shares
of the total contributions o⁄ered by groups trying to in￿ uence the political outcome in the
same direction, then the equilibrium is unique.
153.2 Equilibrium Characterizations
Let us start by looking at equilibria with no provision. Lemma 1.2 directly implies that in
any such equilibrium it must be the case that C (1) = V u and C(0) = V u + R(0;0). Left
to examine are then only the incentives for the business groups. In an equilibrium with no
provision, the ￿rms represented by these business groups do not pay any taxes. They do,
however, have to contribute a total of R(0;0)+V u to the politician. Hence, in any equilibrium
with no provision, the payo⁄s to the two business groups equal ￿[R(0;0) + V u]si; i = 1;2:
The business groups could potentially increase their utility by adjusting their contribution
o⁄ers. An increase in the o⁄ered contributions would not change the political outcome. Any
decrease in the contributions would, however, lead to the policy being implemented. Hence,
the most pro￿table deviation for a business group, if one exists, is to o⁄er the politician
nothing and accept that the policy will be implemented by the government. For the deviating
group this delivers a payo⁄ of ￿t￿iNi = ￿V b
i .
In addition to adjusting the contribution o⁄ers, the ￿rms in sector 1 could potentially
increase their utility by o⁄ering their workers the policy privately, as a way to reduce the
contributions the ￿rms have to pay the politician. It would then have to pay L1k directly to
its own workers. As the workers in sector 1 no longer have an interest in public provision the
unions￿willingness to contribute politically drops, but the business groups would still in order
to prevent public provision have to outbid U2 by o⁄ering the politician R(1;0)+V u
2 . Hence,
for the business group in sector 1 not to want to provide privately it must be the case that
L1k + [R(1;0) + V u
2 ]s1 exceeds the [R(0;0) + V u]s1 that it contributes in the conjectured
equilibrium with no provision. This concludes the analysis of the business groups￿incentives,
and we can summarize with the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The following inequalities are necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the




i ; i = 1;2 (1)
[R(0;0) + V
u]s1 ￿ L1k + [R(1;0) + V
u
2 ]s1: (2)
To illustrate the idea behind the comparative statics, let us assume that condition (2)
is always satis￿ed. (While theoretically a possibility, it is perhaps far-fetched to think that
￿rms would provide this policy privately only to change the amount of contributions they
have to make to the politician.) Furthermore, in order to remove the dependency on the
inter-sectoral bargaining parameters (si) we can add conditions (1) together. Substituting
back in the expressions for V u; V b
i , V u
2 and t then leaves us with the following necessary
condition:
R(0;0) + v (m1L1 + m2L2) ￿ (L1 + L2)k
We can use this condition to analyze what happens as individual parameters change.
Focus, for instance, on the union membership rate in sector 1 (m1). By inspection, we
see that the necessary condition is more easily satis￿ed the lower this unionization rate is,
hence a lower value of m1 means that a no-provision equilibrium exists for a wider range
of values of the other parameters. The interpretation for this result is straight-forward:
a higher unionization rate means politically stronger unions that are willing to contribute
more, which in turn means that the business groups have to contribute more in order to
convince the politician. At some point there will be a cuto⁄ where the unions are strong
enough, and the business groups are no longer willing to contribute what is necessary in
order to prevent an outcome with public provision. The same argument is true for the
unionization rate in the other sector (m2), and similar inspections deliver analogous results
for other parameters. Speci￿cally, we can see that the parameter set under which there exists
an equilibrium with no provision is increasing in the cost of provision (k), while decreasing
in the value of provision (v) as well as in the level of public support that exists when no
17workers receive the policy privately (R(0;0)). These results should not be surprising, but
they serve as a useful background to the analysis that follows.
Moving on to equilibria with public provision, Lemma 1.2 implies that in any such equi-
librium it must be the case that C (0) = V b and C(1) = V b￿R(0;0). As in the no-provision
case, these conditions imply that in the absence of any private provision the ￿losing￿groups,
in this case the business organizations, are already o⁄ering to contribute exactly as much
as they are willing to pay in order to change the outcome. There are then two things that
have to hold in order for there to exist an equilibrium with public provision. First, it has to
be optimal for the unions to actually make the contributions that follow from Lemma 1.2.
Secondly, it has to be the case that B1 prefers the conjectured outcome with public provision
over outcomes where it ￿rst provides its workers with the bene￿t privately then (together
with B2) contributes enough to prevent public implementation. Formally, we can show the
following result:
Proposition 2 Inequalities (3) and (4) are necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the exis-








sj ￿ 0; i = 1;2: (3)
V
b
1 ￿ [R(1;0) + V
u
2 ]sj + L1k1: (4)
Proof. See Appendix A.
In (3), the left-hand side equals the unions￿payo⁄s from following the conjectured strate-
gies, while the right-hand side gives their (highest) payo⁄s if the policy is not implemented
publicly. In (4), the left-hand side is the cost to B1 under the conjectured equilibrium (its
share of the tax burden), while the right-hand side represents the total cost to B1 if it pro-
vides the policy privately and this provision prevents the policy from being implemented
publicly. Note, however, that this second condition is only relevant if the business groups are
strong enough, relative to U2, to prevent public implementation.
18We could again use these equilibrium conditions to see how changes in the parameter
values a⁄ect the equilibrium parameter set. However, as the next subsection contains a joint
analysis of the equilibria with public and private provision let us hold o⁄ on this and move
on to the equilibria with private provision in one sector. Remember that the sectors are
ordered such that if the ￿rms in one but not both of them want to provide privately it is the
￿rms in sector 1. With that in mind, Lemma 1.2 tells us that in any equilibrium with private
provision in sector 1 (only) the following must hold: C (1) = V u
2 and C(0) = V u
2 + R(1;0).
These conditions are similar to the no-provision conditions above, with two di⁄erences. First,
the level of public support is R(1;0) instead of R(0;0). Secondly, the o⁄ered contributions
from the unions equal V u
2 instead of V u, this from the fact that the union in sector 1 no
longer ￿nds it in its members interest to o⁄er any contributions, as they receive the same
bene￿t no matter what the political decision is.
In order for there to exist an equilibrium with private provision, two additional things have
to be true. First, both of the business groups must prefer to pay their o⁄ered contributions to
paying the taxes that comes with public provision. Secondly, it has to be the case that it is in
the best interest of B1 to provide its workers privately. Whether this is the case depends on
what would happen if B1 instead chose not to provide privately. Such a deviation would be
pro￿table if the business groups still were strong enough (relative to the unions) to prevent
public implementation, but not necessarily otherwise. The following proposition formalizes:
Proposition 3 Inequalities (5) and (6) are necessary conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium with private provision by the ￿rms in sector 1. Furthermore, if V u+R(0;0) ￿ V b,




2 ]si ￿ V
b
i ; i = 1;2 (5)
[R(1;0) + V
u
2 ]s1 + L1k1 ￿ V
b
1 : (6)
19Proof. See Appendix A.
In (5), the left-hand side gives the political contributions of each of the business groups in
the conjectured equilibrium, while the right-hand side gives their willingness to contribute in
order not to see it implemented publicly. In condition (6), the left-hand side is the sum of the
private provision payments and the political contributions made by B1, while the right-hand
side again gives B1￿ s willingness to contribute, which equals the tax payments if the policy
is implemented publicly.17
Let us again hold o⁄ on the interpretation of these conditions, and instead directly
move on to characterizing equilibria with private provision in both sectors. Note that if the
workers in both sectors are provided privately, neither of the unions are willing to o⁄er any
contributions to the policy-maker. Hence, Lemma 1.2 implies that in any such equilibrium
it must be the case that C (1) = 0 and C(0) = R(1;1), and the contributions of the business
groups would have to equal R(1;1)si, i = 1;2. In addition, the ￿rms in both sectors would
have to spend a total of kLi in order to provide for their workers privately. Adding up, we
have that the payo⁄s to the business organizations equal ￿R(1;1)si￿kLi. We compare this
to the payo⁄ of ￿V b
i following from public provision. Hence, in order for there to exist an
equilibrium with private provision in both sectors, the following two conditions must hold:
R(1;1)si + kLi ￿ V b
i ; i = 1;2.
In addition to these conditions, we also need to make sure that the second period condi-
tions hold, i.e. that it is in the interest of business organizations to o⁄er enough contributions
to make the political decision-maker not implement the policy publicly. This, however, is
automatically satis￿ed from the fact that the groups prefer private provision and political
contributions to paying the taxes that come with public provision. Hence, we have the
following equilibrium characterization:
Proposition 4 Inequalities (7) are necessary conditions for the existence of an equilibrium
17Note that there is some redundancy among the condition is Proposition 3. Speci￿cally, condition (6)
implies that one of conditions (5), the one for i = 1, is automatically satis￿ed.The proposition is left in this
form for ease of interpretation.
20where the ￿rms in both sectors provide the policy privately to their workers:
R(1;1)si + kLi ￿ V
b
i ; i = 1;2: (7)
To analyze this type of equilibrium, plug the fundamental parameters back into expres-
sions (7). This gives us the following conditions:
R(1;1)s1 + kL1 ￿ k(L1 + L2)
￿1N1
￿1N1 + ￿2N2




We can use these equilibrium conditions to get a sense of when this type of equilibrium
might exist. One way to do so is to start from a completely symmetric setting and see what
happens as we move away from symmetry. That is, assume that the industry and bargaining
structure is complete symmetric, in particular that L1 = L2, N1 = N2, and ￿1 = ￿2. Focus
on any two parameters, say ￿1 and ￿2, that have the same meaning in the two sectors (e.g.
the pro￿ts in sector one and sector two). Then look at deviations away from symmetry in
the form of changes that increase the ratio ￿1=￿2 while preserving the sum of these two
parameters. We then have that any such deviation away from symmetry implies that an
equilibrium with private provision in both sector cannot exist. Formally, if one of the two










￿1N1+￿2N2 ) kL2 ￿ k(L1 + L2)
￿2N2
￿1N1+￿2N2. Intuitively, this follows
from the fact that in an asymmetric world, public provision implies that one sector will
￿subsidize￿the other by carrying a larger share of the tax burden. The subsidized sector
will then have no interest in providing privately, as it always ￿nds the taxes from public
provision less burdensome. Furthermore, note that both of conditions (7) can hold with
equality only if R(1;1) = 0. That is, the necessary conditions can hold only if the ￿rms
do not have to pay any political contributions in order to prevent the policy from being
implemented by the decision-maker.
21Remark 3 Private provision in both sectors requires a perfectly symmetric industrial struc-
ture. Furthermore, if the ￿rms always have to pay some amount of contributions in order
to convince the politician not to implement the policy publicly, then there cannot exist an
equilibrium with private provision in both sectors.
This remark suggests that an outcome with provision in both sectors should be quite
unlikely to exist in the real world. Furthermore, the speci￿c purpose of this essay is to use the
model to analyze a real-world scenario that is inherently asymmetric (with one traditional,
competitive sector, and another new sector with larger and more modern ￿rms). Hence, in
moving towards the application part of the chapter, I will disregard the equilibrium with
private provision in both sectors. From now on, a ￿private-provision outcome￿will simply
refer to an outcome where there is provision in one sector only. It is worthwhile, however, to
keep in mind that the equilibrium with provision in both sectors might still be of theoretical
interest, and that symmetry then is a key feature of this type of equilibrium.
3.3 When to Expect Private Provision
I view as the main contribution of this theoretical model that it shows that we may get
privately provided bene￿ts for political reasons, and that it delivers conditions suggesting
when we might expect to see private provision. With that in mind, let us examine in greater
detail which conditions that favor private provision, and let us do this with a focus on the
case where public provision would follow if there were no private provision. Formally, this
means that for the rest of the subsection we assume V u + R(0;0) ￿ V b.
We now have a ￿clean￿ setting where we can analyze the decision-problem facing B1
in the ￿rst stage of the game. Not providing the policy would lead to a total tax burden
of V b
1 = t￿1N1 = [￿1N1=(￿1N1 + ￿2N2)](L1 + L2)k for the ￿rms in sector 1. Providing
the policy would lead to a direct payment of L1k1 for the ￿rms. In addition, the ￿rms in
sector 1 would have to contribute [R(1;0) + V u
2 ]s1 = [R(1;0) + vm2L2]s1 to the political
decision-maker, assuming that after provision the ￿rms are strong enough relative to the
22union in sector 2 to prevent the policy from being publicly implemented. If the ￿rms are
not strong enough, even after private provision in sector 1, to prevent public implementation
they would again have to pay the taxes, which equals t￿1N1 for the ￿rms in sector 1. Putting
this together we have that the total cost for the ￿rms in sector 1 if they provide the policy
is L1k + minf[R(1;0) + km2L2]s1; t￿1N1g. This leaves us with the following condition:
L1k + minf[R(1;0) + vm2L2]s1; t￿1N1g ￿ t￿1N1: (8)
This is the condition that has to be satis￿ed for the business organization in sector 1 to
decide that its ￿rms should provide privately. From this condition a number of results follow
immediately. First, we can now see formally that there cannot exist an equilibrium with both
public and private provision (as argued informally above). To see this, note simply that the
private-provision condition can never be satis￿ed if the left-hand side of (8) includes t￿1N1.
Second, we can see from condition (8) that asymmetries in pro￿ts favor private over public
provision. Note ￿rst that if the groups always have to contribute at least a small amount to
the politician (R(1;0) > 0;8y 2 Y ), then condition (8) shows that asymmetries in pro￿ts
per worker are necessary for an equilibrium with private provision to exist. (Formally, if
￿1N1=L1 = ￿2N2=L2 then the right-hand side of (8) simpli￿es to L1k, which is strictly greater
than the left-hand side if R(1;0) > 0.) Furthermore, if we move away from asymmetry then
one group, the one that pays less taxes, becomes even less interested in providing privately.
It follows that at most one of the two groups could be interested in providing the bene￿t
privately. Finally as the asymmetries in pro￿ts increase, the parameter set under which
the group that may provide will choose to do so increases. To see that this is true, note
that if [(￿1N1)=(￿1N1 + ￿2N2)] increases then the right-hand side of (8) increases and the
condition is satis￿ed for a larger set of the parameters. Hence asymmetries in pro￿ts favor
an outcome with private provision.
Third, asymmetries in union membership rates also favor outcomes with private provision.
23To see this, note that if we hold ￿xed the aggregate union membership (m1L1 + m2L2), an
increase in the ratio m1=m2 makes condition (8) more easily satis￿ed. Alternatively, as only
the membership rate in the second sector enters the condition, we see that a decrease in
the union membership rate in sector 2 favors private provision. Intuitively, buying o⁄ its
own union with private provision has a greater political e⁄ect for the employers in sector
1 if the union that the ￿rms still have to lobby against in the second stage is weak. This
suggests that when looking at the role of labor unions in the development of welfare states
we should make sure not to overemphasize the importance of unions in the sector with large
and modern industrial ￿rms. Rather than the unionization in this sector, it might be the
(lack of) unionization in other parts of the economy that we should focus on. (More on this
in the application part of the chapter.)
Fourth and ￿nally, we can see from the condition that a lower value of R(1;0) favors
private over public provision. This should not be too surprising. A lower value of R(1;0)
means that there is less political resistance left for the business groups if they provide the
policy in the ￿rst stage. In a similar way as with the union membership rate in sector 2, the
political payo⁄ from private provision is greater the more political resistance it buys o⁄.
3.4 Summary of Baseline Results
To sum up the baseline model, note that for each type of equilibrium we have been able to
identify individual parameters that have unambiguous e⁄ects on its existence. First of all,
certain conditions are associated with an outcome that lacks any form of provision. The
no-provision equilibrium is the most straight-forward scenario, and here the results should
not be too surprising. For instance, the model tells us that a high ratio of cost to value -
that is, a high value of k or a low value of v - favors an outcome with no provision. More
importantly, if unionization is limited in all sectors, the theory tells us to expect an outcome
without any kind of provision. Similarly, if the public opinion, in the absence of any form
of provision, is unsupportive of government provision, we should not expect to see any kind
24of provision. As we move away from these conditions, for instance as public support for
legislative action increases or unions grow stronger, it becomes more likely there will be
some provision in the resulting equilibrium. However, what kind of provision - public or
private - that will result depends on the parameters in more subtle ways. From the analysis
of private provision in the previous section we have the following results that will provide
the basis for the interpretation of real-world structures:
[R(1;0)=R(0;0)] # ) Private provision favored
[m1=m2] " ) Private provision favored
[￿1=￿2] " ) Private provision favored
4 Multiple and Separated Political Powers
The e⁄ects of political institutions on major policy reform, and economic policy more gener-
ally, is a topic that has received extensive theoretical interest. Typically, however, the e⁄ects
of institutions are studied separately from the study of interest groups. In this section I
use a very simple model to study one particular type of interaction between institutions
and interest groups. Speci￿cally, I investigate how the mechanisms outlined in the previous
chapters play out in a model with a power separation that generates multiple veto points.18
Fragmented powers are represented here in the simplest possible way: One more political
decision-maker, with veto power over the implementation of new policies, is added to the
baseline model. This second decision-maker has preferences identical to the ￿rst. The
decisions are made sequentially, with the second decision-maker observing the choice of the
￿rst before acting. Hence, we can think of the second player as a President, Governor,
18The literature on separation of powers and vetoes is far too vast to review here. Of particular relevance
to this study, however, is the veto player framework developed by Tsebelis (2002), and the veto bargaining
literature including McCarty (1997), Groseclose and McCarty (2000) and Cameron (2000), and summarized
by Cameron and McCarty (2004). In addition, there does exist a limited number of papers that formally
analyze the interaction between interest groups and legislative institutions, including Snyder (1991), Grose-
close and Snyder (1996), Helpman and Persson (2001), Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002), and to some extent
also Denzau and Munger (1986). Neither of these studies, however, speak directly to the topic of interest
here.
25second chamber or any other decision-maker or institutional point with the power to veto a
legislative change implemented by someone else.
The speci￿c timing of this extended game is the following: First, the business groups
decide whether they want to implement the policy privately or not. Second, all interest
groups make contribution o⁄ers to the ￿rst politician that are contingent upon the political
decision. Third, the ￿rst politician decides whether to implement the policy or not. Fourth,
all interest groups make contribution o⁄ers to the second politician. Fifth, the second politi-
cian decides whether to implement the policy or not. Finally, all contributions are paid out
according to the (decision-contingent) promises made, and if both politicians have agreed to
implement, the policy is implemented through public provision.
Note that stages one through three are exactly the same as in the baseline model - it is
in this sense that the extension represents the simplest possible way of introducing multiple
veto players into the interest group framework developed above. Note, furthermore, that
the extended model is deliberately kept free from any additional institutional features, as
the idea is to have a framework that is su¢ ciently general to allow for comparisons across
countries whose political systems di⁄er along other dimensions.
The results in this section are divided into two parts, both providing comparisons with
the baseline model. The ￿rst result focuses on the case in which the policy, under the baseline
model setup, would have been implemented publicly:
Proposition 5 Compared to the baseline political model, public equilibria exist under a
strictly smaller set of parameters.
Proof. See Appendix A.
That adding another political decision-maker with veto power should have a tendency to
reduce the possibility of the policy being implemented publicly is not particularly surprising.
However, the proposition is stronger: it says that it is never the case that the policy is
implemented publicly in the model with multiple veto points unless it would also have been
26implemented publicly in the model with a single political decision-maker, while the reverse
may be true.
This result is su¢ cient for concluding that having multiple legislative veto powers in
a political system does not favor public implementation. However, the proposition does
not tell us whether no provision or private provision will occur instead of public provision.
Speci￿cally, it does not tell us whether the addition of a veto point could switch the predicted
outcome from public to private provision. The following proposition establishes that this
indeed can, for some parameter values, be the case:
Proposition 6 There exist parameter values such that the unique equilibrium (type) of the
extended model is one with private provision of the policy, even when there is a unique
equilibrium with public provision in the baseline model.
Proof. See Appendix A.
However, this is not the only way that adding another veto point can change the predicted
outcome. As the following proposition establishes, a public provision outcome might also
turn into an equilibrium outcome with no provision:
Proposition 7 There exist parameter values such that the unique equilibrium of the extended
model is one with no provision (neither public nor private) of the policy, even though the
unique equilibrium of the baseline model is one with public provision.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Together, these three propositions can be summarized in the following way: introducing
multiple, separated powers a⁄ects the interaction between interest groups and politicians in
such a way that social bene￿ts are less likely to be provided publicly. When fragmented
powers lead to public provision being prevented, this can lead either to no implementation
or to private (and non-universal) implementation. Both things can happen, but they happen
for di⁄erent parameter values. In the real world, since some of the underlying parameters
27(e.g. public support) can be di⁄erent for di⁄erent types of policies, one interpretation of this
extension to the model is the following: in countries with more fragmented political systems,
we should probably expect to see less public provision. In aggregate terms we should also
expect to see more private provision, though this does not have to hold for every individual
type of social bene￿t.
5 The American Welfare State
In this section I suggest that the insights from the theoretical model may be used to under-
stand the distinct path of welfare state development taken by the United States during the
20th century. The two subsections that follow are devoted to a discussion of the real-world
features corresponding to the explained and explaining features of the model. In the ￿rst
subsection, I note that in the US, as opposed to other industrialized nations, a signi￿cant
share of social bene￿ts are provided privately through large employers. I also provide some
evidence suggesting that the theoretical equilibrium with private provision is in fact a rea-
sonable description of the American outcome. In the second subsection I piece together
evidence from di⁄erent literatures, indicating that the relevant economic and political con-
ditions of the US did resemble the theoretical conditions shown to lead to private-provision
equilibria. Together, this give us a possible explanation for the unique and largely private
path of American welfare state development, where the model presented above gives the
mechanism that can link the two subsections.
5.1 The US as a Private-Provision Equilibrium
In this section, I argue that the relevant real-world outcomes and strategies in the US during
the 20th Century came to resemble the theoretical equilibrium with private provision in one
sector. For such an argument to be credible, there are at least three explained parts of the
model that have to be veri￿ed: ￿rst, that a signi￿cant share of social bene￿ts were provided
28privately through employers; second, that workers of large ￿rms did receive more privately
provided bene￿ts than workers of small ￿rms; third, that the labor movement was in fact
divided, with some unions being more satis￿ed with their privately obtained bene￿ts and
thus less interested in the development of a public welfare state.
That the ￿rst of these endogenous parts was true, and that the US in this sense has been
a outlier during the second half of the 20th century, has already been discussed in the intro-
duction. While perfect evidence does not exist, we can make this statement somewhat more
precise with the help of the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). This database
includes measures of both public and (mandated and voluntary) private social expenditures
for OECD countries. Unfortunately, data for the mid-20th century, the period of primary
interest here, is not available. Data on current spending levels show, however, that in the
US about 10 percent of GDP is spent in a voluntary private manner on social expenditures,
signi￿cantly more than in any other country. Furthermore, the OECD data shows that the
ratio of private to public social expenditures is .6 in the US, about twice that of the coun-
try with the second highest ratio (the Netherlands with a ratio of .33), and six times the
average ratio for the OECD countries. Figure 1 displays these ratios, for the richest OECD
countries.19
The ￿gure is meant to be indicative, and does not represent a perfect measure of any
part of the theoretical model. Of course, the share of private spending is far from 100
percent in the US, nor is it zero in any other country. However, the fact that the model only
predicts pure outcomes - either no, public or private provision - does not imply that total
expenditures will be of only one kind, as several of the fundamental parameters (say, the
value v or the cost k) may di⁄er across di⁄erent types of public policies. Hence, there is no
reason to expect that a country will ￿nd itself in the same type of equilibrium in all policy
19The values shown in the ￿gure are the 2003 ratios of the unedited ￿totals￿available directly from the
aggregate data series on the OECD (SOCX) website: www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure. The main social
policy areas included in the expenditures are: old age, survivors, incapacity-related bene￿ts, health, family,
active labor market programs, unemployment and housing. Related calculations based on the same data









Figure 1: Ratio of Private to Public Social Expenditures
areas. What matters for this study is that the share provided through the public sector
is smaller in the US than in the countries of comparison, while the private and ￿rm-based
part is signi￿cantly larger. And as the ￿gure indicates, the US does appear to be a unique
outlier.20
With respect to the second endogenous part, there is no question that workers in large
and unionized American ￿rms did (and still do) receive signi￿cantly more non-wage bene￿ts
than other workers. For instance, in 1950 about 95 percent of the members of the CIO unions,
representing primarily workers in oligopolistic industries with large ￿rms, received some form
of health and welfare plans. The corresponding share for the members of the AFL unions,
primarily representing craft workers in more competitive industries, was approximately 25
percent (Gottschalk, 2000, p. 44). To a signi￿cant extent these di⁄erences have persisted
until today. For instance, in 1993, in ￿rms with more than 100 employers, 62 percent of the
employees had dental plans, compared with 33 percent in smaller ￿rms. Similarly, 78 percent
had retirement bene￿ts compared to 45 percent in smaller ￿rms, and 90 percent would get
20The unique nature of the US implies that the empirical argument of this section has to be qualitative
rather than quantitative (econometric) in nature. Though some variation does exist among the other coun-
tries, this variation is limited and I view explaining the outlier status of one data point as the relevant task
here.
30paid for jury duty leave compared to 58 percent in smaller ￿rms (Tone, 1997, p. 253).
When it comes to the third endogenous part, the American story during the post-war
years again resembles the characteristics of the model￿ s private-provision equilibrium. There
were signi￿cant divisions within the labor movement with far from uni￿ed support in favor of
expanding the public welfare state. This was certainly not an obvious outcome; many of the
in￿ uential unions in the US did come out of the New Deal with the intention of extending
the welfare state in a universal direction through the public sector. However, if one looks at
the response of major unions to various attempts to increase the public welfare state later
during the 20th century, such as e⁄orts to introduce a universal (public) health insurance
system, many (though not all) of the large unions favored the system of private and ￿rm-
based bene￿ts. Clearly, during the decades after the New Deal, the labor movement was in
no way uni￿ed.
Why did we seen this lack of a uni￿ed approach among the labor unions? The studies
by Tone (1997) and Gottschalk (2000) suggest the following answer: during the decades
following the New Deal, the years of peak union strength, a split occurred between the
unions representing large ￿rms in the modern, manufacturing sector and unions representing
traditional, smaller ￿rms in more competitive industries. In the words of Gottschalk:
Organized labor was not of a single mind in the late 1940s and 1950s on whether
to put most of its energies into collective bargaining for private-sector bene￿ts or
continue pushing for public-sector solutions like national health insurance. [...] In
a surprising twist, the AFL unions continued to push hard for national health in-
surance while the industrial unions associated with the CIO quickly accepted the
privatization of social welfare provision. [...] The CIO￿ s industrial unions, whose
members tended to work for oligopolistic ￿rms largely insulated from local com-
petitive pressures, were better positioned than the AFL craft unions to establish
viable private-sector welfare plans in the immediate postwar years. (Gottschalk,
2000, p. 43-44)
31Similarly, Tone comments on the fact that ￿it was the CIO, not the AFL, that was chie￿ y
responsible for ushering what economists have called the postwar ￿ fringe bene￿ts revolution￿ ￿
(Tone, 1997, p. 250). The picture that emerges is that the unions representing workers in
larger and more pro￿table ￿rms lost interest in pushing for the development of publicly
provided bene￿ts, as their members gradually received more ￿rm-based bene￿ts of the type
frequently implemented through the public sector in other industrialized nations.
I have argued that the key endogenous features of the model￿ s private-provision equilibria
have corresponding features in the post-war American economy. We can, however, tighten
the connection between theory and actual outcomes by trying to assess strategies. Again
the aforementioned studies on the private American welfare state are useful. While di⁄erent
in purpose from the present study, and at times normative, these studies may nevertheless
be valuable here as they suggests how real-world behavior corresponded to the equilibrium
choices of the players in the model. Of particular interest is the point that ￿rm-based bene￿ts
were part of strategies of employers to a⁄ect the demand for a public welfare state. That
this was in fact the case emerges from both Klein (2001, 2003) and Gottschalk (2000), and
to some extent also from Tone (1997).21 For instance, with respect to health care, Klein
writes:
As part of their larger struggle to establish broad-ranging social security and
job rights - legacies of the New Deal - labor unions tried to promote health
programs that would transcend the limits of ￿rm-based collective bargaining and
would have broken the links between bene￿ts and the ￿rm. Moreover, organized
labor hoped to use the power of the federal government to bolster these e⁄orts,
tightening the connection between workers and the state.
After World War II, American employers fought to sever the links be-
tween workers and the state through both public and private strategies. [...] They
21Tone (1997) focuses on welfare capitalism in the US before the 1930s. However, her ￿nal chapter discusses
the period from the New Deal on. In that chapter, Tone presents a view that is similar to that of Klein and
Gottschalk.
32could not restore the political economic order of the pre-Depression era, but in
the 1950s business interests were able to alter the role of the state in industrial
relations politics and in fact use it to sustain an increasingly insular, private,
￿rm-centered de￿nition of security. (Klein, 2003, p. 205-206)
Similar accounts are given by Gottschalk (2000) and Tone (1997). Gottschalk also makes
the connection to the strategies of labor unions, by noting a surprising lack of support
by many unions, later during the 20th Century, for attempts to introduce national health
insurance:
Labor￿ s tepid and hesitant response to this new push for national health insur-
ance must be understood within the larger context of the development of the
private welfare state. The private welfare state of job-based bene￿ts developed
since World War II to impede the e⁄orts of organized labor secure universal and
a⁄ordable health care in the US. (Gottschalk, 2000)
Similarly, with respect to regulation, Tone concludes that large ￿rms voluntarily took on
private provisions to reduce the pressure for political action:
While independent industrialists in small and medium-sized establishments often
endorsed the National Association of Manufacturers￿antilabor extremism, big
business were able to express its antipathy to state-sponsored social provisions
through the extension and promotion of private provisions. Working to achieve
their own ￿triumph of conservatism,￿employers used voluntary reforms to thwart
the enactment of more stringent provisions. (Tone, 1997, p. 8)
In summary, while not the primary goal of this section, the assessment of strategies
does reinforce the general picture, painted by the earlier discussion of outcomes, of the
US as a country with features that correspond to the endogenous elements of the private-
provision equilibrium of the theoretical model. Yet to be established is why this particular
33outcome - private, non-universal and largely ￿rm-based - occurred in the US and not in other
industrialized nations. It is to this question I now turn.
5.2 Did US Conditions Favor a Private-Provision Equilibrium?
Comparing exogenous attributes of the theory to characteristics of real economies is compli-
cated, as many of the features of the model do not have exact real-world counterparts. Still,
piecing together evidence from several ￿elds, including business history, labor economics and
comparative political science, it is possible to get some sense of how the features underlying
the di⁄erent equilibria of the model compare to real-world structures.
First of all, in comparison with most other countries the United States has a political
system characterized by fragmented institutions and a legislative process with a large num-
ber of veto points. This is shown, for instance, in the measure of institutional veto points
developed by Huber, Ragin and Stevens (1993) and displayed in Figure 2.22 In the exten-
sion to the baseline theoretical model, we saw that this kind fragmentation should imply a
tendency for social policies not to be implemented through the public sector. Even without
considering economic and industrial characteristics, the model thus gives us reason to expect
less publicly provided bene￿ts in the US. Remember, however, that under the addition of
veto points, any of the two other outcomes can replace the one with public provision. What
this means is that political institutions alone does not tell us whether we should expect more
private provision in the US, or simply less provision of bene￿ts overall.
Turning to the structure of the economy, we might be able to gain some clues about the
relevant economic characteristics from the history of American industrial development. Some
background on the longer trends of industrial development is helpful. As a starting point, the
1890s are often referred to as the beginning of American industrial dominance, and sometimes
also as the beginning of the modern industrial era in the Western world. A merger wave in
22That the United States has a large number of veto points is well-established. In addition to Huber,
Ragin and Stevens (1993), see for instance Tsebelis (2002) for a comparison of veto points between di⁄erent
countries.
34Figure 2: Ranking of Countries by Number of Veto Points
the US around the break of the century created industrial giants of previously unwitnessed
scale, and by World War I the industrial structure of the US had taken shape. Large,
integrated companies had developed and come to dominate in capital-intensive industries.
The US superiority was clear, and the country remained dominant well past World War II.23
The development of a new part of the economy, with modern, capital-intensive ￿rms, was
not unique to the US. All now-industrialized countries to some extent experienced a similar
development. Hence, the two-sector setup of the theoretical model, with a traditional sector
(sector 2) as well as a modern and more capital-intensive sector (sector 1), applies not only
to the US but to other countries as well. What is distinct about the US is the fact that
the large, modern ￿rms were particularly capital-intensive and signi￿cantly larger than their
counterparts in most other countries. This particular American development is described
by Nelson and Wright (1992), who conclude that ￿American manufacturing ￿rms and their
technologies not only were resource and capital intensive, but operated at much greater
scale than did their counterparts in the United Kingdom and on the Continent.￿(p. 1939)
In Scale and Scope, business historian Alfred Chandler (1990) gives a similar description
23For descriptions of the rise of big business in the US, and analyses of the great merger movement at the
break of the Century, see for instance Atack (1985), O￿ Brien (1988) and Lamoreaux (1985).
35of the American industrial development from the late 19th century to middle of the 20th
century. Chandler describes capital-intensive industries with very large ￿rms as a central
part of the American manufacturing dominance:
... the United States and Germany to a lesser degree, showed a dramatic trans-
formation from an agrarian to modern society in which almost half of the employ-
ment centered in industry. Within the manufacturing subdivision the branches
that showed the greatest growth in the United States from 1880 to 1948 were
those capital-intensive industries in which large ￿rms dominated. (Chandler,
1990, p. 4)
While these accounts are closely related to key features of the theoretical setup, we need
to take the description of the US economy one step further to say something about the
pro￿ts of American ￿rms in an international comparison. (Remember that the model does
not generate unambiguous predictions based on the size of the ￿rms and their capital and
labor intensities, but it does make predictions based on pro￿ts.) Reliable pro￿t-data is
sparse. Furthermore, as the relevant data is really the perceived and expected, as opposed
to present and recorded pro￿ts, straight-forward international comparisons are not possible.
Absent the ideal pro￿t data it might still, however, be possible to get some indication of how
pro￿table the leadership of large companies expected their ￿rms to be. The most relevant
information for this purpose is company size and industry concentration levels.
Regarding ￿rm size, one of the central points in Chandler (1990) is that in the early parts
of the 20th century there were non-exploited economies-of-scale in many industries. Further-
more, the most successful companies were typically the ones that, through organizational and
managerial innovations, managed to grow to the (large) size where the economies-of-scale
were (just) exhausted. Hence, if one believes Chandler￿ s argument, it is reasonable to expect
pro￿tability on average to be greater the larger the ￿rms. Regarding industrial concentra-
tion, the argument linking it to pro￿ts is more straight-forward. Most basic oligopoly models
36(at least in the Cournot, quantity-competition tradition) deliver the result that greater con-
centration leads to greater pro￿ts.
With this in mind, the evidence presented by Chandler (1990) and related studies, such as
Schmitz (2002), suggests that the expected pro￿ts of US ￿rms were large. First of all, the US
had more modern industrial enterprises early on than any other country. As early as World
War I new and large ￿rms dominated a signi￿cant number of industries in the US and many
of them became long-term leaders in their industries, both at home and abroad. According
to Chandler (1990), the US had far more very large and very successful companies than any
other country, from the early years of the 20th century to the 1970s. For instance, as late
as in 1973, when many European countries had (almost) caught up with the US standard
of living, the US still had 211 ￿large￿corporations according to Chandler￿ s classi￿cation
system. This is a striking number compared with the 190 that existed in all other countries
together.24
Furthermore, it was not simply the case that the American ￿rms were industrial giants
because of the greater size of their country and domestic markets. During the decades around
and just after World War II - the time in which most of the growth in public spending
occurred in the industrialized nations - it appears that the major US corporations were also
large and dominant in their country, relative to similar ￿rms in other countries. Chandler
(1990) comments on the fact that many of the US industries were oligopolies (p. 84-89) and
that the number of very large companies in the US was even greater than what the US share
of output might indicate (p. 47-49). Schmitz (2002) lends further support to that view by
comparing the US to some European countries. He shows that around the time of world
wars, the total industrial concentration, measured by the share of total output accounted
for by the largest 100 companies, was greater in the US than in both Germany and France.
24Note that Chandler views the 1970s as the break point at which the industrialized world entered into
a new era with increased competition and signi￿cant di⁄erences in industry organization. The 1970s also
marks something of a break point for the welfare states, after which fewer new programs were developed and
signi￿cant dismantling occuring in many countries. Since this study is primarily concerned with the creation
and growth of welfare state programs, the period up until the 1970s is the one of primary interest. Hence,
the work by Chandler discussed here provides an appropriate background.
37Connecting this to the theoretical model, where greater pro￿ts for the ￿rms in sector 1 favors
private-provision equilibria, it appears as if the real-world industry and pro￿t characteristics
of the US correspond quite well to the underlying conditions of the equilibrium with private
provision in one of the sectors.
Turning to the union structure, cross-country comparisons for the relevant time periods
are again di¢ cult to perform, due to problems of measurement and di⁄erences in the meaning
of unionization between countries. There does, however, exist some evidence that provides
us with links between the theoretical model and the real-world outcomes: Pearce (1990)
compares unionization in large and small ￿rms in the US, and shows that the unionization
rates of large ￿rms in the US are, and have been for a long time, signi￿cantly greater
than for small ￿rms. Blanch￿ ower and Freeman (1992) include cross-country comparisons
of unionization rates in the manufacturing sector versus other parts of the economy in the
early 1980s. Figure 3 displays the ratios of union membership in the di⁄erent parts of the
economy for all ￿ve countries included in their study. As this ￿gure shows, the gap between
unionization rates in the manufacturing sector and other parts of the economy is greater in
the US than in other industrialized countries. Again it appears that the structures shown
theoretically to favor an equilibrium with private provision - in this case a higher unionization
rate in the sector with large and modern ￿rms than in the more traditional sector - resemble
the real features of the US economy, to a greater extent than for other industrialized nations.
Finally, assuming that political decision-makers care at least to some degree about public
opinion, the theoretical results imply that the e⁄ect on public opinion from private provision
of bene￿ts matters for what type of outcome we should expect. Speci￿cally, a greater negative
impact on public support from private provision (in sector 1) implies that the conditions
for a private-provision equilibria are more easily satis￿ed. The question is then whether
there are reasons to expect that ￿rm-based provision of social bene￿ts would a⁄ect public
opinion di⁄erently in the US than in other countries. This is a di¢ cult case to make, as
public support is notoriously di¢ cult to measure. Furthermore, political scientists as well
38Figure 3: Union Membership Ratios
as economists tend to reject the idea that there is a clear, one-directional link between a
distinct American culture and whatever di⁄erences in public policies that exist between the
US and other industrialized nations.25
Nevertheless, as Alesina and Glaser (2004) among others point out, beliefs about eco-
nomic opportunities and attitudes towards redistribution are likely to interact with, and to
some extent be shaped by, political and economic institutions. Furthermore, remember that
what matters here is not so much public opinion in general as the e⁄ect that private provision
would have on public support. It is certainly imaginable that in the US, a country with a
historical lack of class structures and the image as a land of opportunities, private provision
of social bene￿ts in some part of the economy would have a signi￿cant impact on the general
support for public and universal provision, and one might also imagine that this impact on
public opinion would be greater in the US than in other countries.26 With this in mind, the
real world characteristics with respect to public opinion in the US appear at least not to be
25See, for instance, the introductory discussion in Steinmo and Watts (1995). For a discussion by econo-
mists, see Alesina and Glaeser (2004).
26To what extent the US in fact is a ￿land of opportunity￿is a topic of much debate, not to be resolved
here. During the 20th Century social mobility rates do not appear to have been notably greater in the US
than in European countries. However, it is the perception of opportunities that matters for the formation
of public opinion, and perception may lag behind real conditions. Social mobility does appear to have been
greater in the US during the 19th Century; see Ferrie (2005) and Ferrie and Long (2007).
39inconsistent with the features underlying the model￿ s private-provision equilibria. That is, it
seems unlikely that the e⁄ects of public opinion would work against the other points made
in this subsection. That, however, is about as much as we can say; it would be too strong
to claim that it strengthens the argument in a signi￿cant way.
We are now in a position to summarize the discussion of the model￿ s key explaining
features. The main point is the following: the industry, interest group and political (in-
stitutional) features of the US during the mid-20th century appear to correspond to the
theoretical model￿ s equilibrium with private, ￿rm-based and non-universal provision of so-
cial bene￿ts. The comparison is made primarily with European countries, whose structures
to a greater extent resemble the features underlying the equilibrium with public provision.
This is true speci￿cally for the period from the New Deal until roughly 1970s, i.e. the time
when most welfare states developed into their current forms.
6 Concluding Discussion
In this essay, I develop a formal model of political decision-making over broad, redistrib-
utive policies, with political decisions being made under the in￿ uence of labor unions and
business organizations. At the core is a theoretical analysis that shows that the following
characteristics favor the outcome with private provision over the one with public bene￿ts:
high pro￿ts in the modern, industrialized sector relative to the traditional sector, a low level
of unionization in the traditional sector, and a public opinion that reacts more strongly to
private provision. These are insights that follow directly from the model and are new to the
comparative welfare state literature. In addition, I show that an outcome with public pro-
vision is less likely in a country with a more fragmented political system that has a greater
number of institutional veto points. Furthermore, I show that with additional veto points,
conditions that otherwise would have lead to public provision may (though do not have to)
lead instead to an outcome with ￿rm-based provision.
40After having characterized the equilibria theoretically, I use the model to interpret the
unique American development, with respect to public and private social expenditures, during
the 20th century. I look at existing evidence on industry characteristics, political institu-
tions and welfare state development, and argue that the real-world characteristics of the
US, during the decades after the New Deal, correspond to the features of the equilibrium
with (partial) private provision. The Western European countries can be thought of as the
￿counterfactual,￿ and their conditions to a greater extent resemble those underlying the
model￿ s second equilibrium, the one with public provision. Based on this, I claim that the
model provides a possible explanation for the particular form of American exceptionalism
of interest here: a comparatively small (public) welfare state but an extensive (￿rm-based)
private welfare state.
The theoretical framework developed here is based on the political role of social bene￿ts.
There also exist theories of ￿rm-based bene￿ts that do not rely on this political role. Of
particular interest as a comparison is the work of Moriguchi (2003), as this to my knowl-
edge is the only formalized alternative framework. Moriguchi develops a theory based on
the idea that generous bene￿ts could induce high e⁄ort and loyalty among workers.27 In
principle, Moriguchi￿ s theory competes with the one presented in this essay. However, one of
Moriguchi￿ s central conclusions is that the e⁄ort-inducing reasons behind the ￿rm-based pro-
vision of social bene￿ts disappeared (in the US) along with the Great Depression.28 Hence,
as the theory I develop here is primarily focused on the provision of private bene￿ts during
the decades following the Depression and World War II, the two frameworks complement
each other. That is, while I propose an explanation for the development of the private wel-
27Formally, Moriguchi￿ s work is based on an implicit contract model, and can be thought of as a version
of the theory of e¢ ciency wages developed by among others Akerlof (1982) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
Closely related to the theoretical framework of Moriguchi is the (non-formal) comparative work of Swenson
(2002) on Sweden and the US. Related is also the work of Jacoby (1997), a case-history focused on the
attempts of three large corporations to use wages and bene￿ts to stave o⁄ unionization and government
regulation. Furthermore, some work on industrial development, including the classic text by Piore and Sabel
(1984), contains elements of these arguments.
28According to Moriguchi, events during the Great Depression punctuated the high-e⁄ort equilibrium in
the repeated interaction model that forms the basis of her theory.
41fare state during the post-war years, the work of Moriguchi o⁄ers us a theory of why (some)
￿rm-based bene￿ts also existed during the earlier part of the 20th century.
There are a number of potentially fruitful extensions to this study. The most obvious
would be to extend the quantitative evidence in the application section. In terms of the out-
come (private vs public spending) the US is a unique outlier, and cross-country econometric
work is probably not a reasonable approach. But even if the empirical part has to remain
primarily qualitative, and suggest rather than test the appropriateness of the model setup,
it might be possible to add empirical evidence to the input side, i.e. to the measurement
of parameters such as pro￿ts and unionization. Unfortunately, appropriately de￿ning and
measuring relative parameter values in ways that are comparable across countries, for earlier
decades, is a task that has turned out to be di¢ cult. Hence I simply note for now that more
quantitative evidence would be valuable.
In order to present a limited number of speci￿c insights transparently, the model is
kept as clean from confounding elements as possible. This, however, means there exist a
number of possible extension to the model that might be of theoretical interest in di⁄erent
contexts. First, I view the interaction between political institutions and interest groups as
one of the areas within political economy that are poorly understood and deserve greater
attention. Section 4 of this essay provides the embryo of such an analysis, but this part
is limited to one of many possible institutional features that could be added. Secondly, it
would be of interest to evaluate the e⁄ects of relaxing the commitment assumption, i.e. the
assumption that interest groups actually deliver on their promised support. The question
to answer here would be what kind of outcomes that could be enforced without exogenous
commitment mechanisms. A third possible extension would be to analyze explicitly the
severity of various collective action and coalition formation problems, for instance in a model
with a greater number of sectors and with the possibility of some employers receiving bene￿ts
from government provision. These suggested extensions are of more general nature and fall
outside the scope of this essay, but the framework used here might be a useful basis for
42insights beyond the topic of welfare state development.
A ￿nal possible extension, more directly relevant for this chapter, would be to build on the
theory to analyze questions about institutional persistence. Clearly, the underlying economic
realities of welfare states have changed during the past decades, and the political calculations
of interest groups (and decision-makers) are probably quite di⁄erent from what they were half
a century ago. Yet we see signi￿cant institutional persistence: current policies and political
decisions, in the US as well as other countries, are conditioned by the existing structures.
The work of Hacker (2001) indicates that this is important in the particular context of
private and public American welfare state structures. A greater theoretical understanding
of institutional persistence and path dependence would therefore be of interest in attempts
to assess how policy-making today constrains future political decisions. I end therefore by
noting that questions of persistence in institutions are perhaps the most interesting among
the possible extensions to this study.
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497 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.1: Suppose there exists a SPE in which this is not true, i.e. that either
Cb(1) > 0 or Cu(0) > 0. Suppose that Cb(1) > 0, and focus on a business group Bi that
o⁄ers positive contributions, Cb
i(1) > 0. If the policy is implemented in equilibrium, ub
i =
￿cb
i(1)￿t￿i. By setting Cb
i(1) = 0 the worst thing that can happen to Bi is that the policy is
still implemented, in which case ub
i = ￿t￿i > ￿cb
i(1) ￿ t￿i. Hence, Cb
i(1) = 0 is a pro￿table
deviation. If, on the other hand, the policy is not implemented in equilibrium, ub
i = ￿cb
i(0).
Then if the incentive constraint of the politician is strict, i.e. C(0) > C(1)+R(y); there exists
another contribution o⁄er e Cb
i(0) such that e Cb
i(0) < Cb
i(0) and e Cb
i(0) +Cb
￿i(0) > C(1)+R(y).
The politicians decision does not change, but Bi contributes less. If, instead, the incentive
constraint holds with equality, C(0) = C(1)+R(y), there exists another contribution schedule
b Cb
i; with b Cb








such that b C(0) > b C(1)+R(y). Again,
the politicians decision does not change, but Bi contributes less. Together, these results imply
that there always exist a pro￿table deviation, which contradicts the assumption that this is
an equilibrium. Hence, in any SPE it must be the case that Cb(1) = 0. (The proof showing
that Cu(0) = 0 in any SPE is similar and omitted.)
Proof of Lemma 1.2: Focus ￿rst on a SPE in which the policy is not implemented.
By Remark 1.2 it follows that in any such equilibrium, C(0) ￿ R(y) + C (1), which com-
bined with Lemma 1.1 implies that Cb(0) ￿ R(y) + C (1). If the inequality is strict,
i.e. Cb(0) > R(y) + C (1), for both business groups we can ￿nd deviations e Cb
i(0) 2
￿




such that the politician still does not implement the policy
and the contributions are strictly smaller. Hence, in any SPE it must be the case that C(0) =
R(y) + C (1). To show that C (1) ￿ V u, suppose that C(0) = R(y) + C (1) and C (1) < V u.
Then at least one union can increase the contribution o⁄er to e Cu
i (1) 2 (Cu
i (1); V u
i ), which
leads to the policy being implemented and a strict increase in the union￿ s utility. Hence, in
equilibrium we must have C (1) ￿ V u. Furthermore, note that if there exists an equilibrium
in which C(0) = R(y) + C (1) and C (1) > V u, then there also exists an equilibrium in
50which C(0) = R(y) + V u and C (1) = V u. Note also that among the interest groups, the
contribution schedules in the latter of these two equilibria pareto dominates the schedules in
the ￿rst. Hence, the ￿rst equilibrium violates (ER1). (The proof for the case in which the
policy is implemented is similar and omitted.)
Proof of Proposition 1.2: For there to exists a public-provision equilibrium, it has to
be optimal for the unions to contribute in order to a⁄ect the outcome in their desired direc-
tion. The utility of the unions under the conjectured equilibrium is V u
i ￿
￿
V b ￿ R(0;0)
￿
sj;
for i = 1;2. The ￿rst term equals the value placed by the union in sector i on the bene￿t and
the second term equals the union U1￿ s share of the political contributions. If, instead, one of
the unions choose not to contribute, the optimal thing for it to do is to decrease its o⁄ered
contributions to zero and accept that the policy will not be implemented, and the resulting
utility for that union is equal to zero. Hence, in an equilibrium of this kind, the following








sj ￿ 0; i = 1;2:
Turning to the analysis of private provision, note that the utility of B1 under the con-
jectured public-provision equilibria is ￿t￿1N1 = ￿V b
1 . If, instead, B1 decides in the ￿rst
stage to provide its workers privately, the utility of B1 depends upon what will happen in
the subgame following y = (1;0). If V u
2 + R(1;0) > V b, the only possible outcome is one of
public provision. In this case there is no reason for B1 to provide privately. Formally, the
utility from deviating is equal to ￿t￿1N1 ￿ N1b1, less than ￿t￿1N1. If, on the other hand,
V u
2 +R(1;0) < V b, the only possible outcome in the the subgame following y = (1;0) is one of
no public provision. B1￿ s utility from deviating in the ￿rst stage is ￿[R(1;0) + V u
2 ]sj￿N1b1.
The ￿rst term represents B1￿ s share of what the business organizations have to contribute
to the politician and the second term represents the total cost of private provision in sector
511. We thus have another necessary condition for existence of a public-provision equilibrium:
V
b
1 ￿ [R(1;0) + V
u
2 ]sj + N1b1:
Finally, remember from the assumptions above that the business groups are ordered in
such a way that if there for B2 exists a utility-increasing deviation from its strategy that
includes private provision, then there also exists a deviation for B1 that includes private
provision and increases its utility. Hence, the second inequality implies that B2￿ s incentives
are also satis￿ed. This concludes the analysis of the business groups, as well as the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.3: In order for there to exist an equilibrium with private
provision in sector 1, it must be the case that both of the business groups prefer to pay their
o⁄ered contributions to paying the taxes that comes with public implementation. Following




2 ]si ￿ V
b
i ; i = 1;2:
Furthermore, it has to be the case that B1 actually prefers to provide its workers privately.
Its utility from doing so equals ￿[R(1;0) + V u
2 ]s1 ￿ N1b1. Whether this is optimal or not
depends upon what B1 expects to happen if it chooses not to provide. Suppose ￿rst that
V u + R(0;0) < V b. In this case, the only possible outcome in the the subgame following
y = (0;0) is one of no public provision. For B1, this means a utility from deviating equal to
￿[R(0;0) + V u]s1. Hence, the necessary condition for this case would be [R(1;0) + V u
2 ]s1+
N1b1 ￿ [R(0;0) + V u]s1. Note, however, that the assumptions made in section 2.3 already
rule this out as a possible equilibrium, as the only reason for providing privately would be
to decrease the contributions paid to the political decision-maker.
Suppose then instead that V u + R(0;0) > V b. In this case, if B1 decides to remove its
private provision, a public-provision outcome would follow. The utility from deviating is
then equal to the tax B1 has to pay for public implementation: ￿t1N1 = ￿V b
1 . Hence, the
52necessary condition for equilibrium in this case is:
[R(1;0) + V
u
2 ]s1 + N1b1 ￿ V
b
1 :
In this case the condition could be satis￿ed, so a private-provision equilibrium could exist.
As the incentives for all players have been examined, this concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.5: Suppose that, in the baseline model, there is an equilib-
rium in which the policy is implemented publicly. Then it must be the case that C(1) =
V b ￿ R(0;0), and the unions contribute Ci(1) =
￿
V b ￿ R(0;0)
￿
si; i = 1;2. As this, by
assumption, is an equilibrium outcome, the unions must prefer this outcome to one with no
contributions and no public implementation. Their equilibrium utilities equal -Ci(1) + Liv,
and the greatest utility they can receive if they deviate equals zero. Hence, it must be the
case that -Ci(1) + Liv ￿ 0, for i=1,2. Focus now on the extended model with the addi-
tional veto point. From the results pertaining to the baseline model, we know that if the
policy is implemented publicly, it must be the case that the unions o⁄er Ci(1) to the second
decision-maker, and end up contributing this amount, while the business groups o⁄er V b but
contribute nothing in the end. Using this result, we can analyze the incentives of the interest
groups when they make their contribution o⁄ers to the ￿rst decision-maker. At that stage,
the business groups know that if the ￿rst decision-maker votes in favor of implementing the
policy, they will end up not contributing anything in the latter stage. Hence, they are, again,
willing to o⁄er the ￿rst decision-maker a contribution of V b in return for voting against im-
plementation. Hence, in any equilibrium in which the policy is implemented publicly, the
unions would have to contribute C(1) to the ￿rst decision-maker. However, knowing that
they will have to contribute an equal amount in the latter stage, this will be in their interest
if and only if ￿2Ci(1) + Liv ￿ 0. That is, for there to exist an equilibrium with public
provision, it must be the case that ￿2C(1) + Lv ￿ 0. Note that this is a more stringent
condition than the condition for a public-provision equilibrium in the baseline model. Hence,
53unless there is a change in the private provision decisions, equilibria with public provision
will exist under a strictly smaller set of parameters.
This completes the ￿rst part of the proof. Note, however, that we have only looked at the
subgames that follow after decisions not to provide privately. To show that public-provision
equilibria exist under a smaller set of parameters, we also have to check the incentives for
B1 in the ￿rst stage. That is, we have to make sure that private-provision equilibria of
the baseline model are not replaced by public-provision equilibria of the extended model.
Suppose ￿rst that, in the baseline model, there does not exist equilibria in which a decision
not to provide privately is followed by public provision. It follows immediately from the ￿rst
part of this proof that there still will not exist equilibria with public provision, in the extended
model. Hence, there is no need to investigate the incentives to provide privately. But suppose
instead that, in the baseline model, a public-provision outcome would follow after a decision
not to provide privately. Suppose further that public provision is still an equilibriumoutcome,
in the extended model. Then a private-provision equilibrium could, in principle, turn into
a public-provision equilibrium when the model is extended to include the additional veto
point. Note, however, that this could happen only if, following a private-provision decision,
the contributions required from the business groups to prevent a public-provision outcome
increase as we move from the baseline to the extended model. But since the equilibria
considered are such that the policy is not implemented publicly (on the equilibrium path),
the logic of the ￿rst part of the proof applies again. That is, it can only get less costly for the
business groups to prevent public implementation. It immediately follows that the utility
of B1 of providing the policy privately is at least as great as in the baseline model, hence
private-provision equilibria will not be replaces by public-provision ones. This concludes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.6: Suppose ￿rst that V u > 2V b ￿ R(0;0). Then, in the
absence of private provision, there would also be an absence of public provision. Note
that the condition implies that this is true for the extended model, which implies that




R(1;0) + V b
2
￿
s1 + N1b1. The second of these two inequalities implies that B1 does
not want to provide the policy privately in a baseline model equilibrium. The ￿rst one
implies that in the extended model there does exist an equilibrium in which the business
group prefers to provide privately, rather than accept the public implementation that would
happen otherwise. Finally, note that there does exist parameters such that all of the these
conditions are simultaneously satis￿ed. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.7: Suppose ￿rst that N1b1 > V b
1 . This ensures that B1 would
never choose to provide the policy privately. Suppose further that V b ￿ R(0;0) < V u <
2V b ￿ R(0;0). The ￿rst of these inequalities implies that there can only exist a public
equilibrium of the baseline model, whereas the second implies that the only equilibrium of
the extended model is one with no provision. Note ￿nally that there exist parameters such
that these three conditions are simultaneously satis￿ed. This concludes the proof.
Proposition 8 There always exists a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof. There are four subgames starting in the second period of the game, following y = 00,
y = 01, y = 10 and y = 11. In any such subgame, either V b ￿ V u+R(y) or V b > V u+R(y).
In the ￿rst case, there exists at least one SPE in which the policy is implemented publicly.
For instance, let C1(1) = V u
1 , C2(1) = V u ￿ V u
1 , C1(0) = C2(1) = 0. These contribution
schedules constitute an equilibrium of the subgame following private provision decisions y.
Using a similar logic, if the inequality is reversed the same subgame has at least one SPE in
which the policy is not implemented. Hence, there exists a SPE of any subgame starting in
period two. Rolling back the equilibrium payo⁄s from the subgames, we can think of period
one as a discrete game with two actions available to each of the business groups. Basic game
theory results tell us that at least one equilibrium exists for such a setting.
Proposition 9 Suppose (i) that it would never be in the interest of one of the interest
groups to provide the policy privately. Then, for any parameter values, there exists a pure-
55strategy equilibrium. Furthermore, suppose (ii) that if two or more interest group make
positive contribution o⁄ers towards the same policy choice, there exists some rule that pins
down the distribution of payments among these groups, with no payment exceeding any groups
willingness to contribute. Then, for any parameter values, there exists a unique pure-strategy
equilibrium.
Proof. Building on Proposition 1.8, we know that there exists at least one SPE in pure
strategies of every subgame starting in period two. Fix one SPE in each subgame. If only
one of the business groups is able to provide the policy privately, this group faces a simple
choice between implementing or not implementing in the ￿rst stage, with known continuation
payo⁄s following each choice. Hence we can think of the ￿rst stage as a game with one player
and two possible pure strategies; as there exists a pure strategy equilibrium of this reduced
￿rst-stage game, there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium of the full game. Furthermore, if
we impose some rule that pins down the distribution of payments among groups that o⁄ers
contributions towards the same policy, there is a unique SPE in each subgame starting in
period two. Hence, there exists a (generically) unique equilibrium of the full game.
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